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ABSTRACT
Today people increasingly have the opportunity to opt-in
to “usage-based” automotive insurance programs for reduc-
ing insurance premiums. In these programs, participants
install devices in their vehicles that monitor their driving
behavior, which raises some privacy concerns. Some devices
collect fine-grained speed data to monitor driving habits.
Companies that use these devices claim that their approach
is privacy-preserving because speedometer measurements do
not have physical locations. However, we show that with
knowledge of the user’s home location, as the insurance
companies have, speed data is sufficient to discover driving
routes and destinations when trip data is collected over a pe-
riod of weeks. To demonstrate the real-world applicability
of our approach we applied our algorithm, elastic pathing,
to data collected over hundreds of driving trips occurring
over several months. With this data and our approach, we
were able to predict trip destinations to within 250 meters of
ground truth in 10% of the traces and within 500 meters in
20% of the traces. This result, combined with the amount of
speed data that is being collected by insurance companies,
constitutes a substantial breach of privacy because a per-
son’s regular driving pattern can be deduced with repeated
examples of the same paths with just a few weeks of moni-
toring.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.4 [Information Systems Applications]: Miscellaneous;
K.4.1 [ COMPUTERS AND SOCIETY]: Public Policy
Issues—Privacy
General Terms
Algorithms, Experimentation, Measurement, Security
Keywords
location privacy, usage-based automotive insurance, elastic
pathing
1. INTRODUCTION
In the past, insurance companies did not have a large
amount of information about their customers so everyone
would pay similar prices, despite the large variations in driv-
ing habits. Recently, technological advances have created
ways to observe human driving behavior. Taking advantage
of this technology, some US-based insurance companies [25,
28, 30, 33, 34] now offer consumers vehicle insurance poli-
cies with the option of installing a tracking device into their
vehicle. This allows the insurance companies to charge less
to safe drivers, in an attempt to attract those people as cus-
tomers. However, unlike a truck driver who is being moni-
tored while doing a job, these consumers will be monitored
during all of their daily activities, public and private. Al-
though some of these monitoring devices are based upon
GPS information and offer no privacy protections, (such as
OnStar [27]), many other devices and insurance programs
are advertised as being privacy-preserving. For instance, as
an alternative to GPS data some of these devices log speed
information instead. In this paper, we demonstrate that
logging this timestamped speed data is also not privacy-
preserving, despite the insurance companies claims.
The privacy problem introduced in this paper is signifi-
cant because the data collection by insurance companies is
an “always on” activity. Data may be logged forever, thus,
deducing location data from speed traces represents a huge
breach of privacy for drivers using these programs. Even
if insurance companies are not currently obtaining location
traces from their data today, this does not guarantee it will
not present problems in the future. Because the data is not
considered location data it is probably not being treated as
such, and may eventually be obtained by any number of an-
tagonists that do know how to process the data traces to
obtain location information. For example, law enforcement
agencies may request the information as they have done with
other data sets, e.g. electronic toll records [2].
Breaching user privacy with just a starting point and
speed information is a difficult task, otherwise insurance
companies would not claim that the information being gath-
ered is privacy preserving. Indeed, matching a single speed
trace to all of the roads in a country or state is extremely
difficult, but having the home address of a person, as the in-
surance companies do, provides a starting location for some
paths simplifying the problem.
Reproducing an exact driving path from just speed data
and a starting location is challenging. Speed data does not
indicate if a person is turning at an intersection or merely
stopping at a stop sign or red light, so multiple alternative
pathways exist that match some of the speed data. Of course
multiple routes can be explored, but even within just a few
minute’s drive of a person’s home in our data set there may
be thousands of unique paths that the person could have
taken, so exploring every single possible path is infeasible.
The growth of possible paths within a distance of just one
mile of a starting location is illustrated by Figure 1. There
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Figure 1: Number of path choices within a given
distance of a starting location. The pattern of
growth on a log-linear scale shows that the num-
ber of paths increases exponentially, making explo-
ration of all possible paths infeasible. Within one
mile there are over 106 paths diverging from a gro-
cery store and over 104 paths from a residential area.
Locations central to major transportation routes,
like a grocery store, will see a higher increase in
paths compared to a residential location. Residen-
tial roads are also more likely to dead-end: in this
example the number of paths from the residence ac-
tually falls at the beginning because only one path
does not dead-end immediately.
may only be a few tens or hundreds of roads within a mile
of a starting location, but there are many unique ways to
travel along those roads. At one mile, there are over 100,000
possible paths the driver could have taken when the trip
starts from a grocery store next to several highways.
In addition to the explosion of possible paths the driver
could have taken, the problem is made hard by the fact
that speed data is ambiguous; that is to say it does not
uniquely match just a single path. For example, the speed
of a vehicle making a right turn can also match the speed
of a vehicle making a left, or the speed of a vehicle that
decelerates because of a pot hole. There is no certain way to
tell which way a car goes at an intersection with just speed
data, meaning that a segment of speed data may match
multiple paths.
Since there are so many possible paths and speed data
is ambiguous we must score paths according to some er-
ror metric and seek out the final path with the least error.
However, finding the optimal path from an exponentially
growing search space is not easy. Simple solutions, such as
greedily following a single path, may end in failure without
even finding any solution; for instance when the path cho-
sen by a greedy algorithm suddenly dead ends. Later in the
paper we discuss several other approaches that do not work.
This paper makes two major contributions.
1. We present a novel algorithm – elastic pathing – to ex-
tract location traces from speedometer data and start-
ing locations.
2. Applying this algorithm and to real-world traces, we
show how the data collected by many insurance com-
panies is not privacy preserving despite their claims.
To best of our knowledge, our work is the first to demon-
strate how people’s locations can be discovered based only on
timestamped speed data and knowledge of a single starting
location. We will also show that even without predicting
path endpoints with 100% accuracy long-term data collec-
tion allows an antagonist to eventually identify physical re-
gions that are frequently visited. The combination of our
algorithm with analysis of long-term driving traces can ob-
tain private information from what is currently considered
privacy-preserving data. As minor contributions, we have
collected real-world traces over several months that serve as
a testing set for our approach, we offer suggestions for future
work that may improve path prediction further, and provide
a discussion of privacy-preserving alternatives to the collec-
tion of speedometer data that do not require cryptography
to implement.
2. PRIVACY ISSUESWITHUSAGE-BASED
AUTOMOTIVE INSURANCE
In several countries, including countries in North America,
Europe and Japan, some insurance companies [42] have in-
troduced “usage-based” insurance programs. In addition to
basing insurance premiums on the characteristics of the car
and history and knowledge about the drivers, usage-based
insurance programs also take into account how and when
the car is driven. The incentive to participate by insurance
policy holders is a potential discount to their premiums for
good driving behavior. In addition to providing potential
premium discounts, some companies also provide their cus-
tomers statistical data, such as overviews of driving habits
and information about how much they drive per day or per
week. In the past most of these programs used to track
drivers’ locations with GPS [42], but currently there are sev-
eral programs that claim to be privacy preserving because
they use other kinds of data.
In this paper, we focus on a more recent type of a pro-
gram, which is enabled by collecting speedometer among
other data directly from the car. The idea is that by not
collecting GPS data and instead collecting other driving in-
formation, such as speedometer data, these approaches are
more privacy-preserving since the insurance companies are
not collecting drivers’ locations. There are several insurance
companies in the US that use this method. For example, the
Snapshot device provided by Progressive and the DriveWise
device provided by Allstate will record vehicle speed data
while not collecting GPS locations [25, 33].
The data in these programs is collected by connecting a
device (provided by the insurance company) to the car di-
agnostic port OBD-II [35]. Since 1996, OBD-II has been
made mandatory for all cars sold in the United States [35].
The European Union has also made the European equiva-
lent EOBD [8] mandatory for both petrol and diesel engined
cars in Europe. This standard interface allows for collecting
comprehensive amounts of diagnostic information.
The data that is collected varies with each insurance com-
pany, but in the cases discussed above, it includes time
and speedometer data. The devices will regularly upload
this data to the insurance company’s servers via a mobile
data link. The driving habits that some insurance compa-
nies state that they are interested in include “How often you
make hard brakes, how many miles you drive each day and
how often you drive between midnight and 4 a.m.” There is
also a very important subtlety here. For example, Progres-
sive claims they do not collect the data about when people
are speeding (which some people in the public interpret as
meaning that speed data is not collected at all). Instead,
they do collect speed data, but it follows from the logic that
since they do not know your location, they do not know if
are you speeding or not.
For our analysis of the privacy concerns of these programs
we need to know the sampling rate of the data collection de-
vices, but the companies do not disclose on their web sites
how often do they sample e.g. speedometer data. How-
ever, e.g. Allstate [25] includes the following information
“hard braking events are recorded when your vehicle decel-
erates more than 8 mph in one second (11.7 ft/s2) [and]
extreme braking events are recorded when your vehicle de-
celerates more than 10 mph in one second (14.6 ft/s2).” We
also know that companies will sample data much faster than
they need to. In the United States federal vehicular safety
regulations [44] mandate that vehicles traveling at 20 mph
must be able to brake to a full stop in 20 feet at a decel-
eration rate of 21 feet/second. Since we know what kind
of events the companies are interested in and the maximum
performance of vehicles on the road, we can simply estimate
the bounds on sampling rates based upon the amount of
information required to detect these events.
The events that are to be detected occur over a time inter-
val of just one second (τ = 1). Using the Nyquist sampling
theorem, we know that we must sample at twice this rate
to detect these features, a rate of two samples per second.
This is a lower bound on any feature detection, and compa-
nies may sample at significantly higher rates to detect other
features. Consider that a driver that tailgates very closely
will often tap their own brakes for very short time durations.
If insurance companies wished to detect these events they
would need to sample at a rate that was twice the speed of
these brief taps.
2.1 Summary of Privacy Issues
To summarize the privacy issues, the insurance compa-
nies using speedometer based measurements are claiming
that they cannot find people’s locations based on their col-
lected data. Our work shows this is not true. We will show
in further sections that a lot private location information
is indeed obtainable, contrary to the claim of 100% privacy
protection. Further, by finding out correct paths on the
roads, the insurance companies could also deduce subtle is-
sues such as were the drivers speeding, despite their claims
to the contrary.
We will show that our elastic pathing algorithm is able
to do more than just identify the endpoint of a trip – it
also eliminates a large number of locations where the trip
could not have ended. This is also a serious privacy con-
cern because it allows to identify changes in regular routines
very easily. For example, if a person usually drives for gro-
ceries after work but the predicted path goes in a different
direction, then it is highly likely the driver is breaking their
routine.
Indeed, previous research has shown that location (de-
rived from GPS data) can be automatically analyzed to
produce profiles of driver’s behavior, social activities and
work activities [17]. A comprehensive discussion on the the
consequences of breaches to location privacy are given by
Blumberg and Eckersley [4]. They discuss how location
databases can be used by others to ask questions such as
“Did you go to an anti-war rally on Tuesday?”, “Did you see
an AIDS counselor?”, “Have you been checking into a mo-
tel at lunchtimes?”, “Why was your secretary with you?”, or
“Which church do you attend? Which mosque? Which gay
bars?”
3. RELATEDWORK
A lot of work has concentrated on anonymizing or obfus-
cating [38, 14, 20, 5, 19] location traces because location
traces contain a great deal of behavioral information that
people consider private [5, 24, 37, 43]. Krumm [21] has
written an overview of computational location privacy tech-
niques, and Zang and Bolot [47] have recently questioned the
possibility of releasing privacy-preserving cell phone records
while still maintaining research utility in those records. Ac-
cordingly, predicting future mobility patterns and paths from
human mobility traces is a well-explored topic, including the
following results.
Based on analysis of location data, such as mobile phone
cell tower locations, researchers have shown 1) the nature of
individual mobility patterns is bounded, and that humans
visit only a few locations most of the time (e.g., just two [13,
7, 12]); 2) that there is high level of predictability for future
and current locations (e.g. [41, 9] – most trivially, “70% of
the time the most visited location coincides with the user’s
actual location” [41]); and 3) that mobility patterns can also
be used to predict social network ties (e.g, [46]). In a more
applied domain, GPS traces have been used to learn trans-
portation modes (e.g. walking, in a bus, or driving) [49], for
predicting turns, route, and destination [51], for predicting
family routines (e.g. picking up or dropping of children to
activities) [6], probabilistic models describing when people
are home or away [23], and recommending friends and lo-
cations [50]. However, none of the above work can be used
to discover locations based solely on speedometer measure-
ments and a user’s starting location.
Related work in the field of dead reckoning does suggest
that speedometer traces should have some level of informa-
tion that can be extracted. Dead reckoning works by using
speed or movement data and a known location to deduce a
movement path. Dead reckoning has typically been used
for map building with mobile robots [11] or as an addi-
tion to Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) such
as GPS [18, 48]. When supplementing GNSS data, odome-
ter data for dead reckoning might only be used when GNSS
information is unavailable, such as when a vehicle passes
through a tunnel or an area with many tall buildings. How-
ever, this kind of dead reckoning cannot work without fre-
quent location ground truths as there is no perfect method
to match speed data to turns in a road.
Map building with robots is interesting because there are
often no exact ground truths, only location estimates. Gol-
farelli et al. [11] describe a method that can assemble maps
from arbitrary distance estimates to and from landmarks.
The problem of deducing a traveled path from only speed
data and a starting point is, in some ways, the reverse of this
map building problem: we already have the map, but have
difficulty identifying landmarks (in this case turns) from just
speed data.
Ubiquitous computing devices help people during their
daily lives in different contexts, for instance by monitoring
our activity and fitness levels or interesting events social
that we have attended. However, the ubiquitous nature of
these monitoring devices has security and privacy ramifica-
tions that are not always considered. For example, a lack
of sufficient protection in the Nike+iPod sport kit allowed
other people to wirelessly monitor and track users during
their daily activities [40]. Although these kinds of devices
clearly appeal to consumers, the potential loss of privacy is
a growing concern.
In the specific area of usage-based insurance, the privacy
concerns of these insurance programs have been studied be-
fore by Troncoso et al. [42]. However, this work dates back
to schemes which would send raw location (GPS) coordi-
nates to either insurance providers or brokers, and Troncoso
et al. proposed a cryptographic scheme PriPAYD [42] to ad-
dress the problem. Our work shows that speedometer-based
solutions, which were not considered by Troncoso et al., are
not privacy-preserving either.
Finally, most closely related to our work are side-channel
attacks that use accelerometer data from smartphones [3].
Projects such as ACComplice [16] and AutoWitness [15]
have used accelerometers and gyroscopes for localization of
drivers. However, the information from the smartphone can
be used to actually detect when turns occur. In contrast,
we have only a time series of speed data available. While
this speed data might indicate when a vehicle stops or slows
down at an intersection, unlike accelerometer data, it does
not indicate if any turn is taken.
4. DATA COLLECTION
To test the hypothesis that a driving route can be re-
constructed from a known starting point and a speed trace
we needed to collect a large body of testing data. We re-
quire both a ground truth of GPS data and a sample set of
speed data. This data can be collected with the approach
that the insurance companies use, by connecting a device to
the Onboard Diagnostics standard OBD-II connector. De-
vices connected to the car this way will receive accurate in-
formation about the car’s speed directly from the vehicle’s
computer and can pair these speed values with GPS infor-
mation to provide an accurate ground truth. To log this
information we used a cell phone with GPS and a Bluetooth
enabled ODB-II diagnostic device. We have also logged a
much higher volume of GPS-only data, from which we can
reconstruct the speed trace.
Using the speedometer data from the ODB-II device is
straightforward because raw speed data is immediately avail-
able. However, collecting data using the ODB-II device re-
quired obtaining the devices and was more cumbersome; in
the rush of daily activities it was easier to use just GPS
data gathered from a smartphone. This data requires a
small amount of processing to obtain speed values from lat-
itude/longitude pairs. This was a two step process, as out-
lined below.
First, we used the haversine formula (see appendix) to
approximate distances from the raw GPS coordinates. Next
we simply divide this value by the time interval (in fractions
of an hour) to get an instantaneous speed value for each time
interval. Each speed value is then given a time stamp and
converted into the same format as the speedometer traces.
We note that we did not see differences in the accuracy of
our algorithm between the two approaches of data collection.
4.1 Description of Speed Data
We had seven volunteers collecting data. Five volunteers
collected GPS-only data over the period of several months,
and two volunteers gathered both GPS and speedometer
data with an ODB-II device over a period of one month.
There were 240 data traces that we used for pathing, to-
taling nearly 1200 miles (nearly 2000 km) of driving data
collected, with a median trip length of 4.65 miles (7.5 km),
minimum trip distance of 0.38 miles (0.62 km), and maxi-
mum trip length of 9.96 miles (16.0 km). These traces com-
prise 46 unique destinations, with more than half of these
destinations visited multiple times by individual drivers.
We believe this represents a diverse testing set; if our algo-
rithm works well on this data, with all of its variety (e.g. the
differences between driver’s habits), then it should perform
similarly in many other driving scenarios. In addition to the
differences between driving habits of participating drivers,
there are also differences in their vehicles. Examples of ve-
hicles we used in the study are small sedans, sports utility
vehicles, and a pickup truck. We feel that this represents a
good sample of driving habits and vehicle types, so a pathing
algorithm that works properly on all of these traces will work
correctly across the driving public as a whole. Additionally,
the insurance companies know the make and model of the
vehicle they are insuring and might be able to use additional
information, such as the turning radius of particular vehi-
cles, that we do not use.
4.2 Description of Map Data
Map data was collected from the OpenStreetMap (OSM)
project [36] using their open REST API. We parsed this
data into node adjacency lists, turn restrictions, and other
road characteristics (e.g. speed, directionality) and stored
the data in a local SQL database for rapid querying.
The open street map data is divisible into two main types:
nodes and ways. Nodes are numbered latitude/longitude
pairs. They may document significant map features like
bends in roads or intersections. Nodes may consist of multi-
ple attributes but they always include a latitude, longitude
and a unique node id. Ways are collections of node ids and
some context tags that identify features of the road that
the group of nodes describe. When ways cross the nodes
at the intersection belong to both ways, indicating that a
turn is possible. Turn restrictions are indicated by the way-
ness of the road (one-way or two-way) and additional meta-
information, such as “no u-turn” or “only right turn”.
5. ELASTIC PATHING
In this section, we describe the algorithm we use to recre-
ate a person’s driving path given data trace with speed/time
tuples. Our approach relies upon two features of vehicular
travel. First, there are physical limitations to a vehicle’s
turning radius at high speeds, so a vehicle that travels a
particular path must travel at speed at or below the max-
imum speed possible. Second, people will only stop when
they need to, e.g. at traffic lights and stop signs, until they
reach their final destination. This second assumption is not
always true; a person may need to stop because of actions of
other vehicles, road construction, accidents, etc. However,
when we continually observe a driver only a small number
of traces will have extraordinary events.
We use data from Open Street Maps (OSM) to identify
possible routes and locations of turns and we find the route
that best fits the given speed data. OSM data is in the
form of nodes that are associated with different roads so a
path will be a sequence of nodes. Each node has a physi-
cal location, given by a latitude and longitude, allowing us
to determine distances between segments of road and the
turning angle of a path of nodes.
Each sample from the data trace corresponds to some
amount of distance traveled from one node to the next along
a path. The OSM data provides adjacency data for each
node, so once a node is reached, we must choose which node
to begin moving towards. For instance, a four-way inter-
section will have a single node at the intersection and four
adjacent nodes. Since we reach the intersection from one
direction we have three possible next nodes from which to
choose.
Any pathing algorithm must follow some basic steps. First,
as discussed previously and illustrated in Figure 1, the growth
of paths is too great to explore all possible paths. There-
fore, any algorithm must have some methods of comparing
paths and choosing “better” paths that more closely match
the given speed trace. This also means that the algorithm
must keep a list of possible paths, while also either limiting
growth of the number of paths or removing paths as they
become too plentiful.
Another problem to overcome is that no path perfectly
matches the speed data, because drivers swerve around ob-
jects in the road, or take turns more widely or sharply than
we expect. Increasingly the estimation of a vehicle’s progress
along a path will become incorrect and mismatches might
make even the correct path seem impossible. For example,
if the progress along a segment of road is ahead of the ve-
hicle’s actual position then the vehicle might be going too
quickly to make a turn, but if we somehow corrected the
distance traveled to account for some of these distance esti-
mation errors then we would find that the speed traces lines
up perfectly with the turn. Thus, any algorithm must also
correct paths as it explores them, trying to take into account
these variations in the travel distance.
One could think of many ways to attempt this pathing,
and we thought of and explored several approaches that do
not work before finding an approach that gave surprisingly
good results to be harmful for people’s privacy. Before de-
scribing our novel approach, we will first document the failed
approaches to provide more background information to the
community.
5.1 Failed Approaches
If deducing a driving route from speed data and a starting
location was easy then insurance companies would not claim
that their data collection was privacy preserving. Although
such path reconstruction may seem simple in concept, it is
actually very difficult. The first major difficulty is detecting
turns with only speed data. When someone breaks and then
accelerates, did they make a turn or did they slow down be-
cause the person in front of them was turning? If a person
comes to a complete stop and then accelerates, did they go
straight or turn? When a person stops at an intersection
are they the car closest to the stop light, or are they behind
ten other cars? The speed data alone does not give enough
information, and a single incorrectly identified turn will re-
sult in an error possibly as large as the entire trip distance.
Even if a turn is identified from the speed data, if the pre-
dicted position of the car is off by a few meters then the
wrong intersecting road may be chosen as the destination of
a turn.
In principle, turns could be predicted probabilistically based
upon past driver behavior [10]. However, we assume that
we do not already know information about an individual
driver, so we cannot build a model of their specific driv-
ing. We could consider using a model developed using many
other drivers in the same area [22], but that has the dis-
advantage of predicting the most common turns and paths
rather than the unique path of an individual. Estimating
that a person probably shops at a supermarket near them
or that they probably work at the largest employer in their
town is not necessarily a considerable breach of their privacy.
Instead, we identify specific locations that a particular in-
dividual visits, and are especially interested in those places
that are unique to the individual and not common to many
people.
Since the heart of this pathing problem is the lack of turn
information one approach is to treat this as a classification
problem. Here, we examine the speed traces to extract fea-
tures: stop, right turn, left turn, or straight road. If classifi-
cation would work well, we can assign probabilities to differ-
ent choices at each intersection and eventually find the high-
est probability path. However, road conditions and driving
habits are very diverse. With our data set we were unable
to classify turn features with high enough accuracy to build
correct paths. The sheer volume of paths to explore meant
that unless the correct path was extremely different from
all of the incorrect paths, the algorithm would find some in-
correct paths that looked just as good, or better, than the
correct path.
Another approach we tried was to switch from a proba-
bilistic model to a model where we identified time windows
where turns could occur and did not follow any paths that
would make turns outside of these windows. We expected
this to reduce the number of paths we needed to explore,
perhaps leaving just a few paths at completion. However,
because of the accumulation of distance estimation errors,
turns in the speed data do not align perfectly with the map
data so we need to widen the time intervals where turns were
allowed. As the time windows widen the number of accepted
paths also increased, until we had too many possible paths
to distinguish a single best fit.
We also tried a dynamic programming approach, keeping
track of the score of the best possible path at each node
of the ways in the OSM data. However, there is a subtle
flaw in this approach. Whatever error metric is used for
each path, that error will slowly increase as the path grows
in size due to the slight discrepancies in estimated and real
travel distance. If there are two possible paths to reach a
node then this dynamic programming approach will tend to
favor the shorter path that reaches that node. However, if we
explored the path further we might find that the longer path
with a worse score at the previous node better matches the
road going forward – but with this dynamic programming
approach we would have already dropped that path because
it had the worse score. This error would be unrecoverable.
The approach that works must keep track of the best path
in terms of time; if two paths have the same error score but
one path has traveled through more of the speed samples
then that path is better than the other (up to that point)
because it is accumulating less error per unit time.
5.2 Our Approach: Elastic Pathing
Next, we describe our successful approach we call elastic
Input: The starting point for pathing, StartNode,
and a set of speed samples, Samples, and a
threshold within the best possible score to
accept, δ
Result: Complete = list of possible paths within δ
of the best possible
1 begin
2 Partial ←− {[StartNode ]}
3 Complete ←− ∅
4 while Complete = ∅ OR
5 Partial.first.error < δ× Complete.first.error do
6 P’ ←− gotoBranch (Partial.pop)
7 join (Complete, {x ∈ P’ | x complete })
8 join (Partial, {x ∈ P’ | x incomplete })
9 sort (Partial)
10 end
11 end
Algorithm 1: Pseudo code for the elastic pathing
algorithm.
pathing. This algorithm is based around the observation that
as we attempt to match the speed data to a path we stretch
or compress the predicted distance moved. However, after
reconciling differences between a section of road and the
speed trace we must “pin” the path at that point (which we
call a landmark) because any movement would break apart
the newly reconciled speed/time trace and distance data.
For instance, if the speed data goes to 0 indicating a stop
where there is no intersection we might pull the path for-
ward by some distance to reach an intersection. After this
has been done the path from this point and earlier cannot
be moved since it aligns with a feature in the road. We call
this approach elastic pathing because of the stretching and
compressing of the speed trace to fit the road is conceptually
similar to stretching a piece of elastic along a path while pin-
ning it into place at different points. To help understanding
the algorithm, we introduce a small set of definitions.
Calculated Distance The distance a vehicle traveled
calculated from the speed and time values in the speed
trace.
Predicted Distance The distance along a possible route
on the road at a certain time in the speed trace.
Error The difference between calculated distance and
predicted distance of a possible route.
Feature A vehicle stop in the speed trace or an inter-
section in the road.
Landmark A place where the speed trace and road data
match, but would become unmatched if any stretching
or compression of the predicted distance moved occurs.
This includes the previously mentioned feature, but
also any other place where a mismatch between speed
and road data can occur.
We can compute the fit of a path by the amount of stretch-
ing and compressing that needed to be done to make the
speed data match the path. The more stretching and com-
pressing along a path the worse its score. At each iteration
of the algorithm we sort all of the partial paths by their cur-
rent scores and then explore the path with the best score.
Input: A path, P, speed samples, S, and the
current index into the speed samples, i
1 while i < S.length do
2 // Match turns at intersections to
slower speeds.
3 if P at intersection then
4 P’ ←− ∅
5 foreach Edge ∈intersection (P) do
6 if S[i].speed ≤ maxSpeed (P, Edge)
then
7 Pin (P)
8 join (P’, P ∪ Edge)
9 end
10 else
11 Fore ←− compressA (P)
12 Back ←− stretchA (P)
13 join (P’, Fore)
14 join (P’, Back)
15 end
16 end
17 return P’
18 end
19 // Match 0 speeds to intersections.
20 if S[i].speed ≈ 0 then
21 while S[i].speed ≈ 0 AND
22 i < S.length do
23 + + i
24 end
25 if P at intersection then
26 Pin (P)
27 return P
28 end
29 else
30 Fore ←− compressB (P)
31 Back ←− stretchB (P)
32 return {Fore, Back }
33 end
34 end
35 + + i
36 end
Algorithm 2: Pseudo code for the gotoBranch
function used in the elastic pathing algorithm. This
code advances a single path until it reaches discrep-
ancy between the speed trace and road. When this
happens the path is corrected with compression or
stretching and the path is“pinned”at what we call a
landmark and the path’s error is recomputed. Mul-
tiple possible paths may be returned at intersec-
tions.
That path advances until it reaches a feature that requires
a “pin” operation. At this point there may be multiple ways
to advance the path so several new paths may be created.
Each new path’s score is adjusted to reflect the stretching
or compression of the distance traveled from the last pinned
landmark and the algorithm proceeds to the next iteration.
The algorithm follows with the best score at each iteration,
so the first path to finish cannot be worse than any other
path. The pseudo-code for this algorithm is given in Algo-
rithm 1.
The most complicated operation done in the ElasticPathing
algorithm is gotoBranch function, whose pseudo code ap-
pears in Algorithm 2. The gotoBranch function advances
a path until it comes to a feature on the map and returns
every possible branching from that feature. There are two
features: an intersection in the road of the path and a zero
speed section of the speed samples.
When a path reaches an intersection it explores every pos-
sible direction. If the path is going at a speed where it can
move along the curve in the road then a landmark is set at
that location with the Pin function. If the curve in the road
is too great for the current speed then the distance moved
from the last landmark is compressed with the compressA
function and stretched with the stretchA function. Thus,
when there is a mismatch between the speed samples and
road data there are two ways to resolve it and thus two new
possible paths.
A similar situation occurs when the speed data indicates
that the vehicle has come to a stop. If the path is already
at an intersection then the landmark is set with the Pin
function. Otherwise the two solutions are found with the
compressB and stretchB functions. Rather than compress-
ing or stretching the speed trace as in the previous compress
and stretch functions, these functions compress or stretch
the route data from the last landmark until an intersection
is found to match the zero speed segment.
After any landmarks are set, the ratio of stretching or
compression from the last landmark increases the error of
each path. This means that a preexisting path may have
less error than the current paths and should be explored
instead, so all possible branches are returned to the elastic
pathing function, the paths are placed in sorted order by
their error, and pathing continues with the new best path.
There are several details that we do not show in the pseudo-
code. For instance, when we check if we are at an intersec-
tion we allow space for the number of lanes in the intersect-
ing road and offset for another car in front of our vehicle.
Determining the maximum speed of a turn is done by as-
suming the maximum allowed incline in the road (7%) [39],
the turn radius of the road based upon the number of lanes
in the road and typical lane widths [1], and the turn angle
equation [39].
6. RESULTS
We generated results for 240 traces comprising 46 unique
destinations of 7 different individuals. Of these destinations,
28 were visited more than once and 10 locations were visited
more than 5 times. The median trip length was 4.65 miles
(7.5 km) with a minimum trip distance of 0.38 miles (0.62
km) and maximum trip length of 9.96 miles (16.0 km). The
2009 National Household Travel Survey NHTS found the
average drive distance is 9.62 miles on weekdays and 10.03
miles on weekends [45], so our drivers had short, but not
unreasonable commutes. Traces were taken at many differ-
ent times of day and in varying road conditions over several
months, and we believe that these traces are representative
of common driving behavior.
A Ruby implementation of the elastic-pathing algorithm
processed all of the traces in under 30 minutes on a 2-core
2.2GHz machine, with an average running time of less than
ten seconds per trace. Even without an implementation in a
high-performance language, the algorithm is able to process
traces far faster than they are generated. Since data analysis
could essentially be done in real-time as a vehicle’s speed
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Figure 2: The best possible case, a path from a shop-
ping store to a home with no error. The ground
truth is indicated with a solid line while the nodes
along the predicted are shown as dots. In this case
the predicted and actual paths match perfectly.
trace is being collected, the limiting factor on the time delay
between data recording and path prediction is probably the
time overhead of collecting, transmitting, and preprocessing
(e.g. matching a trace to a specific driver and their known
locations) speed traces. This means that it may be entirely
feasible to do near real-time tracking of drivers with just
speed data, although the tracking will not be 100% accurate.
The CDF of errors is shown in Figure 3. In 10% of the
traces, the pathing algorithm found an endpoint that was
within 250 meters of the actual endpoint and 30% of the
traces were within 800 meters of the actual endpoint. This
distance is easily accurate enough to tell when a person goes
home, what areas a person drives through, and can identify
many destinations of a driver. Since the size of a parking
lot in a movie theater or shopping center is comparable to
these error values, this level of detail is enough to gain an
in-depth view of an individual’s lifestyle and habits. When
we consider that individuals often take multiple trips to the
same locations it is clear that, over time, every location that
is commonly visited will be identified.
The relative inaccuracy of our approach does not go up
with trip distance, as shown in Figure 4. The percent of
predicted endpoints within 250 meters of the actual end-
point also does not decrease with distance in our data set,
with trips as long as 10.5 miles still having endpoints cor-
rectly predicted to within 250 meters. Our approach clearly
does much better than random guessing and almost always
correctly identifies at least the general direction of travel.
The direction of travel is not a very serious privacy concern
though, so we will use another filtering step to screen out
“noise” from incorrectly predicted points.
We can further take advantage of multiple available traces
for each driver to screen out points that may be noise. We
note that erroneous predictions are unlikely to repeatedly
find the same wrong location and instead usually make mis-
takes in different locations. Thus, we can use the frequency
that locations are predicted as a way to remove poor pre-
dictions and focus only on common destinations, as shown
in Figure 5. The first row of the figure, Figure 5(a,b), shows
predicted endpoints while the second row, Figure 5(c,d),
shows ground truths. The first column, Figure 5(a,c), shows
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Figure 5: These plots show how repeated trips to the same endpoint reinforce that location. Circles (with
radius 500m) represent endpoints for one individual’s trips. The darkness of each circle indicates the frequency
of that endpoint. The top row of plots (a,b) shows the predicted endpoints while the bottom row (c,d) shows
ground truths. The first column (a,c) shows all endpoints, while the second shows only those endpoints that
were visited at least five times. Although prediction error causes the set of all predicted endpoints to be noisy
(a) reducing this map to the frequently visited endpoints (b) creates a set of locations that closely resembles
the groundtruth map of frequent endpoints (d).
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Figure 3: The CDF of the distance from the
pathing algorithm’s endpoint compared to the
ground truth’s endpoint. In 10% of traces the algo-
rithm found an endpoint less than 250 meters from
its actual location and 30% of the traces were within
800 meters of the actual end point. With thou-
sands of driving traces gathered per individual per
year this gives an insurance company a very detailed
view of an individual’s lifestyle and habits. Results
did vary with the individual; the top 30% of one
driver’s traces were all within 500 meters while that
same percentage were only within 1300 meters for
another driver.
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Figure 4: The average error of endpoints relative
to trip distance. This figure shows that there is no
noticeable decrease in the performance of the elastic
pathing algorithm with trip distance. Manual anal-
ysis of our algorithm’s performance shows that pre-
diction accuracy is more strongly influenced by the
route taken and traffic encountered than by the trip
distance. The expected error from guessing is sim-
ply the distance from the starting point to a random
location along the circumference of a circle centered
at the starting point and with radius equal to the
trip distance.
all endpoints, while the second column, Figure 5(b,d), shows
only the endpoints that occurred with high frequency in the
traces. Although the initial endpoint predictions (Figure 5a)
are very noisy, filtering the endpoints by frequency in Fig-
ure 5b creates a collection of endpoints that is fairly close
to the ground truth in Figure 5d.
We also noted that some individuals were more easily
tracked than others. Although the top 10% of traces for
traces from all individuals had a maximum error of 250 me-
ters, for one individual the top 10% had a maximum error
error of only 164 meters, and the top 30% of those individ-
ual’s traces still had errors of less than 500 meters. These
individuals actually commuted along the same major road
and lived in similar areas, so the differing performance of
the pathing algorithm on these two individuals is likely to
stem from differences in their personal driving character-
istics and the driving characteristics of their vehicles than
from the areas where they drove. The practical meaning
of this is that learning the common locations and habits of
some individuals might be much easier than for others.
The pathing algorithm is able to do more than just iden-
tify the endpoint of a trip – it also eliminates a large number
of locations where the trip could not have ended. This is also
a serious privacy concern because it allows an antagonist to
identify changes in regular routines very easily. For example,
if a person usually goes home after work but the predicted
path goes in a different direction then it is highly likely the
person is breaking their routine.
When the algorithm has enough information and a route
is very unique – for instance the spacing between intersec-
tions on the road travelled does not match the spacing in
any other road – the algorithm can do very well. This is il-
lustrated in Figure 2. However, this case is not normal, and
at the very end when the algorithm chooses the correct left
turn it may just as well have chosen to turn right or gone
straight. However, even if the algorithm made the wrong
choice it would still be close to 100 meters from the actual
destination.
• We believe the probability of error is closely tied to a
few factors:
– Homogeneity of roads. If every road seems the
same (same speed, similar intersection intervals,
etc), especially as in areas built in a grid, then
they cannot be distinguished.
– Traces with only slow speeds. Without high speeds
to rule out turns and constrain paths to a few
major roads the correct path is indistinguishable
from any other.
– Unpredictable stops from traffic, construction, etc.
The largest barrier to improved performance is distin-
guishing one road from another. If two roads have similar
features (e.g. same speed, similarly spaced intersections)
then there is little way for the algorithm to distinguish be-
tween the two. This is also affected by the traffic pattern of
the trip; if a vehicle stops at every intersection because of
red lights then there is a great deal of information about the
spacing of those intersections. If, however, the vehicle stops
at no lights then there is no information about the spacing
of intersection on the current road. With more prior infor-
mation we may be able to do better – for instance, if we
knew the average waiting time at different lights then the
waiting time at an intersection might distinguish one road
from another even if a vehicle only stops at one or two lights.
This additional information, such as the average wait time
at certain lights, or the average traffic speeds of different
roads during different times of day, may already be available
to insurance companies and this information is not difficult
to gather. If the algorithm had this information available it
could score different turning choices with higher accuracy,
leading to improved results.
7. DISCUSSION
The implications of our results are that, given just times-
tamped speed traces and a starting location, the privacy of
a driver will be eroded as more of their speed traces are col-
lected. This is even though our approach does not yet pre-
dict traces and trip endpoints with 100% accuracy. Driving
habits are often regular and locations are visited multiple
times, so an antagonist gets many chances to correctly iden-
tify traveled paths. As a person’s driving traces are collected
and analyzed, a set of possible destinations will be built for
that person. A set of thousands of possible destination will
be reduced to a handful. Incorrect endpoint predictions are
noisy and unlikely to repeat, so over time the endpoints that
are predicted the most are increasingly likely to be correct
predictions of a person’s common destinations. Thus, we
believe that the large body of data already collected and
still being collected would allow an antagonist to deduce
many details about a person’s regular routine and irregular
events. Starting from a person’s home address an antago-
nist could identify work locations, commonly visited stores,
locations associated with regular hobbies, etc. Additionally,
any breaks in routines would be very obvious because the
details that could be obtained from a speed trace, such as
distance traveled, duration of trip, and predicted endpoint
of the trip, would all change.
It is possible for companies to adjust their sampling rates
to reduce the potential for privacy breaches, however, there
is no guarantee that someone could not improve upon our
algorithm and obtain results better than ours even with a
lower sampling rate. Perhaps the best way to improve the
privacy protection of these systems is to do data processing
in the car before sending it to a remote server, so that only
the end results are ever transmitted and stored.
7.1 Privacy-Preserving Alternatives
Although it is tempting for a company to capture as much
information as possible in case that data becomes useful
later, this also presents unnecessary privacy risks since. In
the case of auto insurance companies, a speed trace is not
vital to this system, as the real goal is the detection of unsafe
driving habits, which can be detected with a more privacy
preserving set of driving features.
There are alternatives to collecting speedometer readings
which should have much better privacy protection. In fact,
some usage-based insurance programs are already offering
more privacy-preserving products. Companies such as GMAC
insurance, MileMeter and Corona Direct offer programs that
only require the mileage information from vehicles [28, 31,
26]. PAYD coverage provided by Hollard Insurance Com-
pany collects mileage information and driver style informa-
tion [29]. Companies like PayGo Systems collect driving
zone information instead of fine-grained location, besides ba-
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Figure 6: An example path where the algorithm cor-
rectly follows most of a path but predicts the wrong
turn when the speed trace runs out of features.
sic information including mileage and minutes of use [32].
The best practice for such monitoring systems is to only
record relevant data. For example, devices could check speed
data but only send a notification when an even of interest
was detected. In general, this approach could be applied to
other data collection methods, including GPS.
7.2 Limitations and Improvements
Our main limitation is the difficulty distinguishing be-
tween similar roads. When a vehicle stops at an intersec-
tion and then accelerates slowly a turn or straight path are
both possible, so our algorithm relies upon later features in
the speed trace to determine which of the possible routes
was correct. At the ends of paths there are simply too few
features to make this distinction. At the beginning of paths
this may simply cause there to be too many possible paths to
sort through. These problems are exacerbated in residential
areas, where repeated, similar intersections are common.
We notice that travel through residential areas tends to
occur at either ends of paths rather than during the mid-
dle, because traveling through a residential area is unlikely
to be the fastest route to a destination. Fixing mistakes
in residential areas by incorporating additional knowledge
about the area may greatly improve our algorithm’s success
since we had little difficulty reconstructing paths along ma-
jor roads, but tend to make mistakes once the path leaves
major roads. An example of this is in Figure 6.
There are two ways these errors could be addressed. First,
the street addresses of customers are available so the al-
gorithm could check for paths to a person’s known home
address at the end of predicted paths. Second, at the be-
ginnings of paths drivers move from local roads to larger
arteries, so the algorithm could also attempt to simply take
the shortest paths to major roads if there are too many am-
biguous turn choices at the beginning of a path.
When accepted for publication, we will open source our
work, which contains tools to get the needed map data from
Open Street Maps, and implementations of our algorithms.
We will also include a subset of the collected traces that has
been explicitly authorized to be made publicly available on
CRAWDAD or similar archival sites.
8. CONCLUSIONS
We have demonstrated an attack against user location pri-
vacy that uses speed data from driving traces and an initial
starting location. This problem seems simple in concept,
but is difficult in execution largely because turn detection
with speed data is often ambiguous. For instance, if someone
breaks and then accelerates they could have turned or they
could have slowed down because the person in front of them
was turning. We have presented the design and implemen-
tation of a novel elastic pathing algorithm and used a large
corpus of real-world traces to show its accuracy. Our trials
showed that the algorithm is fast, and could also be used for
real-time tracking of people just based on their speed data.
Our results show that with a large corpus of data an entity
can errode individuals’ privacy and gain information about
typical routes and destinations. In 20% of individual traces
we predicted the correct trip end point to within 500 meters.
This means that a location visited daily can be identified in
about a week; locations visited on a weekly basis could be
identified with slightly more than a month of data.
Variations in daily routines are easier to identify than end-
points. Even when the algorithm does not correctly find the
proper end point it does correctly follow much of the actual
travelled path. If that predicted path breaks from a normal
routine, such as going home after work, then a malicious
entity may be able to either deduce where the person could
have gone with some foreknowledge of the person’s habits
or take advantage of their altered routine.
In time, we expect that improvements will be made to our
initial approach. The data, once collected, does not go away
and a continually improving path prediction algorithm may
plumb more private information from these traces. These
traces should be treated as any other private information
instead of being handled as already anonymized data. Our
work is not directed against any company or organization
– experiences have shown that even well-intentioned uses of
data can result in losses of privacy so we wish to highlight
potential dangers of this type of data collection.
Usage-based insurance has been introduced in at least 39
states of the United States, and more are approving the ap-
proach because it has been claimed to be privacy-preserving.
Our work shows that speed-based data collection erode user
privacy of policy holders over time. We do not claim that
insurance companies are violating policy holder privacy in
this way. However, the general principle of any privacy pre-
serving data collection is to collect only the data that is
necessary for a particular application, and no more.
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APPENDIX
A. HAVERSINE FORMULA
A = (sin2(
∆lat
2
) + sin2(
∆lon
2
))× cos(lat1)
×cos(lat2)
C = 2× atan2(
√
A,
√
1−A)
Distance = R× C × 0.62 (1)
Where ∆lat,∆lon are the changes in latitude and longi-
tude respectively, and R is the radius of the earth (aprox-
imately: 6,371km). The factor of 0.62 is for km to miles
conversion.
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